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Abstract
This thesis presents the development of a new and separate market for trading Demand
Response (DR) in a deregulated power system. This market is termed Demand Response
eXchange (DRX), in which DR in the form of hourly load reduction is considered a product
to be negotiated between two groups of market participants, namely buyers and sellers. DR
buyers, including all transmission companies (Transcos), distribution companies (Discos),
and retail companies (Recos) need DR for their risk management benefits related to, for
instance, transmission and distribution network security, and electricity market volatility.
Sellers, including all Energy Service Companies (ESCos), are capable of significantly mod-
ifying electricity customers demand to supply DR on request. The trading between these
sellers and buyers is settled by a new system operator termed DRX operator (DRXO).
Two alternative market clearing schemes, namely pool–based and agent–based, are de-
veloped as the ground technical mechanism of a DRX. In the former scheme, all sellers and
buyers are required to submit offers and bids reflecting their marginal costs and benefits,
respectively, derived from a set of DR quantities. Based on this collected information, the
DRXO will clear the market by centrally maximizing the total benefit for all participants
under some economic constraints, i.e., demand–supply balance. In the other hand, in an
agent–based scheme the participants are viewed as economic agents that behaves in a self–
interested manner. The scheme will be designed to constrain each agent to ensure optimal
global efficiency, while also allowing agents to maximize their own profits locally.
In order to evaluate these DRX schemes, we develop a comprehensive assessment frame-
work using certain economic valuation methodologies such as cost–benefit analysis and ex-
ternalities treatment. Firstly, DR cost and benefit for each pariticipant in the market (i.e.,
buyers and sellers) are analysed in detail. Based on this local analysis, a global evaluation
is performed to determine whether the optimized DR can give a positive social surplus. If
so, the DR will be dispatched during the hour under consideration. Using this newly de-
veloped assessment framework, we demonstrate the advantages of DRX over conventional
DR trading/scheduling schemes.
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Throughout the thesis, both analytical proofs and numerical examples are provided to
substantiate the advantages of the proposed DRX schemes. Our formulations rely on a wide
range of theories: demand–supply modeling with a competitive market equilibrium, cost–
benefit analysis, spot pricing of electricity, and network reliability assessment. Numerical
simulations are performed on various test systems, including the Roy Billinton Test System
(RBTS), to illustrate the effectiveness of DRX in analysing and optimizating DR benefits.
Thesis outline
With reference to the DRX topics given above, the thesis is organized into six chapters.
The following is a brief description of each chapter.
• Chapter 1 presents an introduction into the general research area of DR and overviews
a range of challenges associated with scheduling the DR capacity. First, we discuss
some unusual characteristics of electricity demand that entails a careful development
of an electric power supply system. The status of this development to date is exam-
ined with a particular focus on issues related to power industry restructuring and
deregulation. Then DR as a potential solution to these problems is introduced and
its actual financial benefit estimated for the Australian national market. Finally, the
proposed investigation into the crucial task of scheduling DR is outlined with a list
of research topics to be presented in subsequent chapters.
• Chapter 2 introduces the novel concept of DRX and demonstrates its necessity as a
new and separate market for trading DR. Here all the existing approaches to DR are
classified and reviewed according to which electricity players (either Transcos, Discos,
or Recos) are central to the analysis. The common limitations of these approaches
motivates the development of a new and comprehensive scheme for scheduling DR. It
is very interesting that such a scheme which considers DR benefits for all stakeholers
turns out to be a new DR trading market—the DRX.
• Chapter 3 presents the design of a pool–based market clearing mechanism for DRX.
First, we discuss the notions of economic pool and then pool–based market clearing,
with illustrations based on examples relating to the wholesale electricity market.
We then utilizes these concepts to develop a centralized optimization model used to
clear the DRX market. This model has an objective function (i.e., maximizing total
DR benefit for all players) and several economic constraints including: 1) demand–
supply balance; and 2) the pricing of DR as a market product. Numerical simulation
on a small power system are also performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed pool–based clearing mechanism.
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• Chapter 4 designs and evaluates an agent–based clearing mechanism as an alternative
of the pool–based. As similar to Chapter 3, here we firstly introduces the concepts of
economic agent followed by agent–based market clearing. We also explain the major
advantages and drawbacks of an agent–based versus a pool–based schemes. Then a
formal development, with the objective of achieving Pareto efficiency outcome given
by a competitive market equilibrium point, is presented with numerous analytical
proofs aiming to check the robustness of the proposed clearing approach. Case study
is also given to substantiate this analysis.
• Chapter 5 proposes a comprehensive assessment framework to rigorously analyse the
costs and benefits derived from DR under either DRX or conventional DR scheduling
and trading schemes. Several standard economic assessment methodologies are con-
sidered in this chapter to develop the proposed framework. Two sets of case studies,
one on a small power system and the other on the well–known Roy Billinton Test
System (RBTS), are then presented to illustrate the combined use of these methods
for DR cost–benefit analysis and to demontsrate the advantage of DRX over existing
DR schemes.
• Chapter 6 finally summarises the major contributions of the thesis and suggests some
directions for future studies aiming to extend the research work reported here.
To be concise, we do not present a single methodological chapter reviewing all concepts,
theories, and techniques applied to our subsequent DRX analysis. Those methods will be
distributed through the four main chapters where they actually employed.
The work outlined above was conducted from March 2009 to January 2012 at the School
of Engineering, Univerity of Tasmania (UTAS). The candidate’s research supervision was
jointly provided by Prof. Michael Negnevistky from UTAS and Dr. Martin de Groot from
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). It is hoped that
the thesis will be of interest and value to the potential readers whose task involves trading
and/or scheduling DR capacity in deregulated power systems.
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